This innovative book proposes a new institutional arrangement for government to fulfil the needs of its citizens as well as possible. Existing aspects of federalism and direct democracy in Europe are strengthened, and as a result future developments arising in the region are coped with better. In this book Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger propose a new model of federalism which includes new types of governmental units established by citizens from below. These units are called functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions as they extend over task-specific areas and therefore overlap. They also provide competitive governance via direct and representative democratic institutions, and as jurisdictions they have independent power over taxation policy. This new model is more responsive to citizens' preferences and adjusts more dynamically to provide public services efficiently. The authors suggest that this new system should be allowed to develop in Europe to safeguard diversity and ensure that decentralization emerges effectively. It would also allow for the flexible integration of East European transition economies into the European Union and may also combine with traditional modes of government in developing countries. This book will be warmly welcomed by economists, political scientists and sociologists interested in the future of the European Union, by all those studying federal systems of government, and by those interested in the prospects for improving democratic institutions throughout the world.

This innovative book proposes a new institutional arrangement for government to fulfil the needs of its citizens as well as possible. Existing aspects of federalism and direct democracy in Europe are strengthened, and as a result future developments arising in the region are coped with better. In this book Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger propose a new model of federalism which includes new types of governmental units established by citizens from below. These units are called functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions as they extend over task-specific areas and therefore overlap. They also provide competitive governance via direct and representative democratic institutions, and as jurisdictions they have independent power over taxation policy. This new model is more responsive to citizens' preferences and adjusts more dynamically to provide public services efficiently. The authors suggest that this new system should be allowed to develop in Europe to safeguard diversity and ensure that decentralization emerges effectively. It would also allow for the flexible integration of East European transition economies into the European Union and may also combine with traditional modes of government in developing countries. This book will be warmly welcomed by economists, political scientists and sociologists interested in the future of the European Union, by all those studying federal systems of government, and by those interested in the prospects for improving democratic institutions throughout the world.

Denmark and Switzerland are small and successful countries with exceptionally content populations. However, they have very different political institutions and economic models. They have followed the general tendency in the West toward economic convergence, but both countries have managed to stay on top. They both have a strong liberal tradition, but otherwise their economic strategies are a welfare state model for Denmark and a safe haven model for Switzerland. The Danish welfare state is tax-based, while the expenditures for social welfare are insurance-based in Switzerland. The political institutions are a multiparty unicameral system in Denmark, and a permanent coalition system with many referenda and strong local government in Switzerland. Both approaches have managed to ensure smoothly working political power-sharing and economic systems that allocate resources in a fairly efficient way. To date, they have also managed to adapt the economies to changes in the external environment with a combination of stability and flexibility.

Denmark and Switzerland are small and successful countries with exceptionally content populations. However, they have very different political institutions and economic models. They have followed the general tendency in the West toward economic convergence, but both countries have managed to stay on top. They both have a strong liberal tradition, but otherwise their economic strategies are a welfare state model for Denmark and a safe haven model for Switzerland. The Danish welfare state is tax-based, while the expenditures for social welfare are insurance-based in Switzerland. The political institutions are a multiparty unicameral system in Denmark, and a permanent coalition system with many referenda and strong local government in Switzerland. Both approaches have managed to ensure smoothly working political power-sharing and economic systems that allocate resources in a fairly efficient way. To date, they have also managed to adapt the economies to changes in the external environment with a combination of stability and flexibility.